This paper examines how firms' asymmetric cost behavior influences analysts' earnings forecasts, primarily the accuracy of analysts' consensus earnings forecasts. I
I. INTRODUCTION
Management accountants have traditionally focused on cost behavior as an important aspect of profit analysis for managers. Financial analysts, however, estimate firms' future costs in the process of forecasting future earnings. Predicting cost behavior is, therefore, an essential part of earnings prediction. Yet, a potential relationship between firms' cost behavior and properties of analysts' earnings forecasts has not yet been explored. This study integrates the management and financial accounting disciplines by showing effects of cost behavior on: (i) the accuracy of analysts' consensus earnings forecasts, (ii) the extent of analyst coverage, and (iii) the market response to earnings announcements.
Focusing on cost behavior, I build on a concept of sticky costs (Anderson et al., 2003) . Costs are termed sticky if they increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount. A firm with more sticky costs shows a greater decline in earnings when activity level falls than a firm with less sticky costs. Why? Because more sticky costs result in a smaller cost adjustment when activity level declines and, therefore, lower cost savings. Lower cost savings result in greater decrease in earnings. This greater decrease in earnings when activity level falls increases the variability of the earnings distribution, resulting in less accurate earnings prediction.
Results, based on a sample of 44,931 industrial firm quarters for 2,520 firms from 1986 through 2005, indicate that sticky cost behavior reduces the accuracy of analysts' consensus earnings forecasts, controlled for environmental uncertainty, the amount of available firm-specific information, the forecast horizon, and industry effects.
Classifying costs into sticky and anti-sticky costs, 1 findings show that analysts' absolute consensus earnings forecasts for firms with sticky cost behavior are, on average, 25% less accurate than those for firms with anti-sticky cost behavior.
Evidently, cost behavior is an influential determinant of analysts' forecast accuracy.
The results are robust to potential managerial discretion that might bias the cost stickiness measure and to estimating cost stickiness over a long time window.
The findings extend Banker and Chen (2006) , who show that recognizing cost behavior explains a considerable part of analysts' advantage over time-series models.
Cost stickiness is shown to influence the magnitude of analysts' earnings forecast errors, particularly when market conditions take a turn for the worse. Analysts' understanding of cost behavior has important implications for accounting academics who use the consensus forecast as a proxy for earnings expectations. The findings are also useful for investors who use consensus earnings forecasts to value firms, as it suggests that higher costs stickiness indicates more volatile future earnings.
Addressing the extent of analyst coverage, I examine the relationship between the accuracy of earnings forecasts and the extent of analyst coverage. While Alford and Berger (1999) and Weiss et al. (2008) document a positive relationship, Barth et al. (2001) report that analysts tend to prefer covering firms with intangible assets characterized by volatile performance. Thus, the evidence is mixed and this
relationship is an open empirical issue. I find that firms with more sticky cost behavior (and less accurate earnings forecasts) have lower analyst coverage, controlled for the amount of available information, environmental uncertainty, intensity of R&D expenditures, and additional determinants of supply and demand for analysts' forecasts reported in the literature (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1996) . Findings indicate that firms' cost behavior affects analysts' coverage priorities.
Finally, I examine whether investors understand cost stickiness in responding to earnings announcements. As earnings predictability decreases, reported earnings provide less useful information for the prediction of future earnings and the response coefficient decreases (e.g., Lipe, 1990) . If investors recognize cost stickiness to some extent, being aware that cost stickiness diminishes the accuracy of the analysts' earnings forecasts, then more sticky cost behavior causes investors to rely less on realized earnings information because of its low predictability power. Similarly, I
find a weaker market response to earnings surprises for firms with more sticky cost behavior. Overall, findings indicate that cost behavior matters in forming investors'
beliefs regarding the value of firms.
This empirical examination is facilitated by a new measure of cost stickiness at the firm level. I estimate the difference in cost function slopes between upward and downward activity adjustments. While Anderson et al. (2003) and subsequent studies use cross-sectional and time-series regressions to estimate cost stickiness, 2 the proposed measure puts less demand on data and allows for testing the sensitivity of the results to key cost model assumptions. The new measure corroborates prior evidence on variation among firms' cost stickiness and provides room for estimating cost stickiness of firms operating in industries with a small number of firms, which limits a meaningful estimation of regression models.
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This study expands the audience of cost behavior concepts. Traditionally, cost behavior has attracted the attention of management accountants interested in decisionmaking and control. The results show that financial analysts benefit from understanding cost behavior as well. Further, the findings contribute to our understanding of how analysts use public information reported in financial statements to recognize cost behavior (e.g., Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997; Brown et al. 1987) .
In sum, the paper integrates a typical management accounting research topic, cost behavior, with three standard financial accounting topics. The importance of integrating both streams of research has long been recognized and several studies have called for such integration (e.g., Hemmer and Labro, 2007) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the hypotheses are developed in section II, the research design is described in section III, the empirical results are in section IV. Section V offers a concluding remark on the prospects of integrating management and financial accounting research.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
Despite the wide interest in analysts' earnings forecasts, prior research has not yet investigated the relationship between firms' cost behavior and properties of analysts' earnings forecasts, notwithstanding the essential part that costs prediction plays in the process of earnings prediction. Prior empirical studies support evidence that the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts increases in the amount of information available regarding the firm (Atiase, 1985; Lang and Lundholm, 1996) , increases in firm size but not in firm complexity (Brown et al., 1987) , and decreases in the level of uncertainty in the firm's production environment (Parkash et al. 1995) . Recently, Banker and Chen (2006) reported that cost behavior explains a considerable portion of the analysts' advantage in earnings prediction over various time-series models.
The recently developed concept of sticky costs provides a compelling setting for exploring why and how cost behavior affects the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. I build on Balakrishnan et al. (2004) to demonstrate the intuition underlying the relationship between the extent of cost stickiness and the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. Balakrishnan et al. (2004) argue that the level of capacity utilization affects the managers' response to a change in activity level.
Suppose a firm has high capacity utilization. The firm's managers are likely to use a decrease in activity level to relieve pressure on available resources. An increase in activity level, however, may cross resource thresholds and trigger a disproportionate increase in resources supplied. That is, the response to a decrease in activity level would be lower than the response to a similar increase in activity level, resulting in sticky costs -depicted by the thick solid line in Figure 1 .1.
By contrast, suppose the same firm experiences excess capacity. Its managers are likely to use the slack to absorb the demand from an increase in activity level.
However, an additional decrease in activity level is interpreted as confirming a permanent reduction in demand and triggers a greater response. Under excess capacity, the cost response to an activity level decrease exceeds the cost response to a similar increase in activity level, resulting in anti-sticky costs -depicted by the dashed line in Figure 1 .1.
In case of a decrease in activity level, sticky cost behavior results in higher costs than anti-sticky cost behavior because cost stickiness slows the process of downward cost adjustment. That is, sticky costs result in a small cost adjustment when activity level declines and, therefore, low cost savings. Lower cost savings result in greater decrease in profits. 4 Thus, profits would be lower under the sticky cost response to a demand fall than under the anti-sticky cost response. This greater decrease in profits increases the variability of the profits distribution, resulting in less accurate prediction. Figure 1 .2 depicts the profits under sticky costs and anti-sticky costs, respectively. Apparently, the variability of the profits under sticky costs is greater than under anti-sticky costs. Now, suppose an analyst predicts future profits. For simplicity, I assume that future activity level would either increase or decrease by an equivalent volume with equal probabilities. I further suppose that the analyst recognizes cost behavior to a reasonable extent. Assuming that the analyst announces expected profits as her forecast (e.g., Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2006) , the absolute forecast errors on both an increase and a decrease in activity level are greater in the presence of sticky cost behavior than in the presence of anti-sticky cost behavior. In other words, the variability of the forecast errors increases in the extent of cost stickiness. An adjustment costs model that formalizes the argument for both activity level decreases and increases is presented in the Appendix. I hypothesize that analysts' earnings forecasts for firms with more sticky cost behavior are, on average, less accurate than for firms with less sticky cost behavior. My first hypothesis is:
H1. Increased cost stickiness reduces the accuracy of analysts' consensus earnings forecasts.
Prior literature documents a relationship between the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts and the extent of analyst coverage (e.g., Alford and Berger, 1999) .
Recently, Weiss et al. (2008, The following hypothesis is stated for convenience only and is not a prediction.
H2.
Firms with more sticky cost behavior have lower analyst coverage.
There are two noteworthy points here. First, an analyst cannot enhance accuracy determined by cost behavior even if she recognizes cost behavior and has perfect information on the firms' ex-ante earnings distributions. To see this, suppose firms A and B are in the same industry and face the same environmental uncertainty.
Illustrating a cost behavior effect rather than a potential information advantage, I
further suppose that an analyst has perfect information on both firms.
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Perfect information means that the analyst knows the ex-ante earnings distribution of both firms. If costs of firm A are more sticky than costs of firm B then the variability of the ex-ante earnings distribution of A is greater than that of B. Therefore, covering 5 Prior studies find that the number of analysts covering a firm increases in firm size (Bhushan, 1989) , in industries with more stringent disclosure requirements (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990) , and in firms with more informative disclosure policies (Lang and Lundholm, 1996) . 6 The argument holds if the analyst has any equivalent amount of information on both firms.
firm A is likely to result in higher absolute forecast error than covering firm B. In other words, an analyst cannot influence accuracy determined by cost behavior.
The second point relates to the analyst's attitude toward large negative forecast errors.
Ample evidence shows substantial declines in share price following a negative forecast error (i.e., missing analysts' consensus expectations). To some extent, analysts' short-and long-term benefits are affected by their relationships with managers of covered firms (Lim, 2001 
where τ is the most recent of the four recent quarters with a decrease in sales and τ is the most recent of the four recent quarters with an increase in sales,
and EARNINGS is income before extraordinary items (Compustat #8).
STICKY is computed as the difference in the cost function slope between the two most recent quarters from quarter t-3 through quarter t, such that sales decrease in one quarter and increase in the other. If costs are sticky, i.e., if they increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount, then the proposed measure has a negative value. A lower value of STICKY expresses a more sticky cost behavior. 7 That is, a negative (positive) value of STICKY indicates that managers are less (more) inclined to respond to sales drops by reducing costs than they are to increase costs when sales rise.
Following prior sticky costs studies, STICKY uses a change in sales as an imperfect proxy for activity change because changes in activity level are not observable.
Employing sales as a fundamental stochastic variable is in line with Dechow et al. (1998) , who suggest a model of earnings, cash flow and accruals, assuming a random walk sales process. Banker and Chen (2006) use sales as a fundamental stochastic variable for predicting future earnings.
Since analysts estimate total costs in the process of earnings prediction, the stickiness measure concentrates on total costs to gain insights on a potential relationship between stickiness of total costs and the accuracy of analysts' earnings predictions.
Investigating how cost stickiness affects analysts' earnings forecasts, I use sales minus earnings. Employing total costs for the proposed analysis also eliminates managerial discretion in cost classifications (Anderson and Lanen, 2007) . I also assume that costs increase in activity level (as in the adjustment costs model presented in the Appendix). This assumption means that a cost moves in the same direction as activity and precludes cost increases when activity falls and cost decreases when activity increases (Anderson and Lanen, 2007) . For this reason, I do not use observations with costs that move in opposite directions in estimating STICKY. The ratio form and logarithmic specification make it easier to compare variables across firms, as well as alleviating potential heteroskedasticity (Anderson et al., 2003) .
The proposed measure has several advantages. First, and most important for this study, STICKY estimates cost asymmetry at the firm level. Thus, it provides means for investigating how cost behavior impacts analysts' earnings forecasts. Moreover, it allows for a large-scale study without restricting the analysis to firms with at least 10 valid observations and at least three sales reductions during the sample period (see Anderson et al., 2003, p. 56). 8 Second, by design, the stickiness of a linear cost function is zero, i.e., STICKY=0 for a traditional fixed-variable cost model with a constant slope for all activity levels within a relevant range. That is, a zero value indicates that managers change costs symmetrically in response to sales increases and declines.
Third, the proposed cost stickiness measure has a wider scope than Anderson et al. (2003) because it allows for cost friction with respect to sales increases. For instance, Chen et al. (2008, p. 2) argue that empire-building incentives are "likely to lead managers to increase SG&A costs too rapidly when demand increases." They report a positive association between managerial empire building incentives and the degree of cost asymmetry. STICKY allows for an examination of how cost asymmetry affects the forecast accuracy, but also affords a distinction between the effect in the presence of decreases in sales (i.e., as presented by Anderson et al. (2003) ) and in the presence of increases in sales. That is, estimating STICKY at firm level allows for a separate examination of its effect on forecast accuracy on sales increases and sales decreases.
Nonetheless, there are potential measurement errors in the suggested cost stickiness metric. First, the model assumes a piecewise linear specification of the cost function within the relevant range of activity, which simplifies the analysis and allows for measuring cost stickiness when the upward and downward activity changes do not have the same magnitude. This approximation is consistent with prior studies on sticky costs and reasonable in the context of investigating a relationship between attributes of cost behavior and properties of analysts' forecasts.
8 In measuring skewness of firm-specific earnings distributions, Gu and Wu (2003) require each firm to have at least 16 quarterly observations. Second, the model assumes a realization of an exogenous state of the world that determines activity level. However, growth or reduction in activity can occur not only because of changes in activity level but also because of changes in prices of products or resources or other managerial choices (Anderson and Lanen, 2007) . I restrict the sample to competitive industrial firms to partially alleviate this problem, and later test the sensitivity of the results to potential managerial discretion.
To check consistency with prior literature, I compute the suggested measure for two Taken as a whole, the stickiness measure is expected to provide broad insights on the relationship between cost behavior and properties of analysts' earnings forecasts.
Measuring the accuracy of the analyst consensus forecast, I follow the model prediction and employ the mean absolute earnings forecast errors as an inverse accuracy measure. This accuracy gauge has been extensively used in the accounting literature (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996) . Thus, the forecast error is defined as:
and the absolute forecast error is ABS-FE it = ⎮ FE it ⎮, where the analyst consensus forecast is the mean of analyst forecasts for firm i and quarter t announced in the month immediately preceding that of the earnings announcement. The relatively narrow time window and the short forecast horizon control for the timeliness of the forecasts and mitigate a potential trade-off between timing and accuracy (Clement and Tse, 2003) .
Testing hypothesis H1
In testing whether a more sticky cost behavior results in greater mean absolute analyst consensus earnings forecast error, I control for the amount of available firm-specific information, for the inherent uncertainty in the operations environment, and for the forecast horizon. The literature reports that an increased amount of available firmspecific information reduces the forecast error. The amount of information acquired by analysts is positively related to firm size (Atiase, 1985; Collins et al. 1987; Bhushan, 1989) . Accordingly, I use firm size as a control variable and expect a negative coefficient. Brown (2001) reports a disparity between the magnitude of earnings surprises of profits and losses. I use a dummy variable to control for losses since they reflect more timely information and are associated with larger absolute forecast errors than are profits. The coefficient on losses is expected to be positive.
Bhushan ( Environmental uncertainty is likely to influence the forecast accuracy. If the business environment is highly volatile, then one would expect large forecast errors. I use two proxies for the level of environmental uncertainty. First, the coefficient of variation in sales is employed to directly capture sales volatility, which is in line with the above proposition. Second, analyst forecast dispersion is used to measure other uncertainty aspects of firms' earnings (Barron et al. 1998) . Brown et al. (1987) and Wiedman (1996) report that the accuracy of analysts' forecasts decreases in the dispersion of the analysts' forecasts, which is used to proxy variance of information observations. I estimate the following three cross-sectional regression models with two-digit SICcode industry effects:
9 Readers may find gross margin a meaningful variable from a costing point of view because it comprises both product price and costs. In that respect, a positive relationship between MARGIN and ABS-FE indicates another relationship between costs and the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. My approach is in line with Banker and Chen (2006) , who use variable costs for earnings prediction. FLLW it is the number of analysts' earnings forecasts announced for firm i and quarter t in the month immediately preceding that of the earnings announcement.
DOWN it is defined in Matsumoto (2002) and equals 1 if unexpected earnings forecasts are negative and 0 otherwise.
VSALE it is the coefficient of variation of sales measured over four quarters from t-3 through t.
DISP it is the standard deviation of the analysts' forecasts announced for firm i and quarter t in the month immediately preceding that of the earnings announcement, deflated by stock price at the end of quarter t-1.
MARGIN it is the ratio between SALE it , minus COGS (Compustat #30) and SALE it .
Values below zero or above one are winsorized.
SEASON it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the change in earnings from the same quarter in the prior year (Compustat #8) is positive and 0 otherwise. In other words, if analysts recognize cost behavior then the extent of cost stickiness will not influence the mean forecast error.
Second, I test the sensitivity of the cost stickiness measure to a longer time window. I compute the ratio of change in total costs to change in sales using data on eight quarters, from t-7 through t. Then, I use available data to estimate M-STICKY, that is, the difference between the mean slope under downward adjustments and the mean slope under upward adjustments. Thus, M-STICKY accounts for downward adjustments and upward adjustments made on eight quarters. Comparing M-STICKY with STICKY can provide insights on the perseverance of firms' cost behavior over up to eight quarters. To check the robustness of the coefficient estimates, I estimate the following regression model:
Again, if the above metric captures the cost stickiness, then the hypothesis predicts
Third, I partially examine effects of cost stickiness generated by past decisions, such as technology choice and labor compensation contracts, on the absolute forecast errors. Specifically, I consider two forms of managerial discretion: current decisions made in response to realized market conditions on current quarter t, and past decisions made on quarters prior to quarter t. I view adjustments of activity levels as responses made in reaction to realized market conditions, in contrast with past decisions made in advance. Substituting STICKY i,t-1 for STICKY i,t serves as a control for effects of current decisions only. In other words, STICKY i,t-1 is a proxy for the extent of cost stickiness estimated by an analyst on an earlier quarter, which excludes all managerial discretionary choices made on quarter t, such as price discounts or accrual manipulations.
Model 1(e)
As before, the hypothesis predicts β 1 <0 in model 1(e).
Testing hypothesis H2
Testing the association between cost stickiness and analyst coverage, I regress FLLW on cost stickiness and control variables. The analyses include independent variables to control for the amount of available information, for environmental uncertainty, for the intensity of research and development expenditures, for additional determinants of supply and demand for analysts' forecasts reported in the literature, and for year effects and two-digit SIC-code industry effects.
Prior literature reports that firm size is a primary determinant of coverage (Bhushan, 1989; Hong et al. 2000; Das et al. 2006) , perhaps because large firms have more available firm-specific information than small firms (Collins et al., 1987) . The extent of information asymmetry between managers and investors is likely to enhance demand for earnings forecasts, but analysts are required to invest more resources in acquiring information. I use research and development expenditures as a proxy for information asymmetry because firms with more intangible assets exhibit greater information asymmetry (Barth et al., 2001; Barron et al. 2002) .
Controlling for uncertainty in the forecasting environment, I employ the coefficient of variation in sales as a direct measure for shocks in demand. In addition, analyst forecast dispersion and the absolute forecast error on the prior quarter are included to measure other uncertainty aspects of firms' earnings (Brown et al., 1987 and Matsumoto, 2002, respectively) . Again, Das et al. (1998) argue that analysts extract higher rents by following less predictable firms, because demand for private information is the highest for these firms, but the accuracy of the forecasts is expected to be lower. Thus, the net effect of uncertainty in the forecasting environment on an increase in the extent of analyst following is ambiguous.
I also control for growth and trading volume (Lang and Lundholm, 1996) , which provide analysts with greater incentives to cover firms. Finally, Baik (2006) argues that firms experiencing financial distress appear to suffer from self-selection by analysts. Accordingly, I also control for losses.
Having count-data in the dependent variable, I follow the suggestion made by Rock et al. (2001) and use the standard negative binomial distribution to estimate regression models 2(a) through 2(c):
Model 2(a)
FLLW it = β 0 + β 1 STICKY it + β 2 MV it + β 3 RD it + β 4 VSALE it + β 5 DISP it + β 6 ABS-FE it + β 7 GROWTH it + β 8 TV it + β 9 LOSS it + ε it , Model 2(b) 
Market tests of hypothesis H3
The third hypothesis predicts that market response to earnings surprises is weaker for firms with more sticky costs than for firms with less sticky costs. coefficient is predicted to be weaker for firms with more sticky cost behavior, β 2 >0.
Sample selection
The sample includes all industrial firms (SIC-codes 2000-3999) from 1986 to 2005.
The study is limited to industrial firms for two reasons. First, it allows examination of the effects of a potential variation in cost stickiness of the COGS and SGA cost components on the accuracy of the earnings forecasts. The homogenous structure of the profit and loss statement among industrial firms allows insights into the effects of sticky cost behavior among these two major cost components on the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. Second, industrial firms (in contrast to utilities and other regulated industries) generally operate in competitive markets, which partially mitigates the measurement error due to a potential pricing effect, rather than to a volume effect.
The data is obtained from Compustat, IBES, and CRSP. For each firm quarter, I use the consensus forecast calculated as the average of all forecasts announced in the month preceding that of the earnings announcement. Actual earnings are taken from IBES, as they are more likely to be consistent with the forecast in treating extraordinary items and some special items (Philbrick and Ricks, 1991). Following Gu and Wu (2003) , I require stock prices to be at least three dollars to avoid the small deflator problem. Announcement dates are taken from Compustat rather than IBES, which has more firm quarters with missing announcement dates. In line with the model assumption, the sample is limited to firm-year observations, such that costs and sales change in the same direction. The final sample consists of 44,931 firm quarters for 2,520 firms. The linear nature of raw materials consumption may partially explain this disparity in cost behavior. Another potential explanation for this finding could be that salaries and advertising expenses are likely to be classified as SGA. The cost stickiness of total costs is also in line with the negative skewness of the earnings distribution reported by Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Gu and Wu (2003) .
Descriptive statistics and consistency with an earlier cost stickiness measure
The standard devation of STICKY, SGA-STICKY, and COGS-STICKY is 0.4897, 0.6944 and 0.4707, respectively, indicating considerable variation among firms' cost behavior.
Examining whether the classification of per firm cost stickiness tends to remain persistent over time, the likelihood of firm i keeping the same cost classification (either sticky or anti-sticky) over two consecutive quarters is 75.2% (not tabulated).
The Spearman (Pearson) correlation between STICKY and M-STICKY reported in Table 2 is 0.48 (0.45), indicating sensible perseverance over eight quarters.
Additionally, the Pearson (Spearman) coefficient between the STICKY i,t-1 and STICKY it estimates is 0.43 (0.44), both significant at α=1% (not tabulated),
indicating that firms' cost behavior is reasonably stable over quarters.
[ Tables 1 and 2 about Table 3 are positive and significant, indicating consistency between the proposed cost stickiness measure and the earlier evidence on the stickiness of SGA costs.
[ Table 3 about here]
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Results of testing hypothesis H1
Testing whether more sticky cost behavior results in less accurate analysts' earnings forecasts, Table 4 presents the mean and median absolute analysts' earnings forecast errors contingent on sticky (STICKY<0) versus anti-sticky (STICKY≥0) cost classification. The mean absolute error for firms with sticky cost behavior is 0.0080, whereas that for firms with anti-sticky cost behavior is 0.0060. Thus, forecasts for firms with anti-sticky cost behavior are, on average, more accurate by 25% = (0.0080-0.0060)/0.0080 than forecasts for firms with sticky cost behavior. The difference is statistically significant (α=5%) and economically meaningful.
[ Tables 4 and 5 about here] is associated with lower accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts.
As for the control variables, results for MV and LOSS are generally consistent with expectations, indicating a positive and significant relationship between the amount of available firm-specific information and forecast error. The coefficient estimates on DOWN and FLLW are insignificant across the regression models, possibly due to differences among analysts in the underlying costs, earnings models and access to management information: a large number of analysts covering a firm can proxy variation in the underlying costs and profits models, resulting in considerable noise.
As expected, the findings for DISP and to a limited extent for VSALE indicate a positive and significant association between the absolute magnitude of the forecast errors and the uncertainty in the firm's environment of operations.
MARGIN is positively associated with ABS-FE, indicating that large gross margins increase the analysts' earnings forecast errors. The seasonal effect, SEASON, is also insignificant across the regression models, indicating that analysts recognize the seasonal effect and adjust their forecasts accordingly.
Results of two sensitivity models 1(d) and 1(e) are also reported in Table 5 Second, I examine whether current (rather than past) managerial discretion affects the hypothesized relationship. I check whether the regression coefficient estimates are sensitive to discretionary choices made by managers on quarter t by replacing STICKY it in model 1(a) with the cost stickiness measure estimated on quarter t-1, STICKY i,t-1 , which excludes all managerial choices made on quarter t.
Estimating regression model 1(e), the coefficient estimate on STICKY i,t-1 is -0.0035
(p-value=0.029). The negative and significant coefficient estimate indicates that more sticky cost behavior observed in a preceding quarter is associated with higher absolute analysts' forecast errors. I conclude that cost stickiness estimated by analysts on a preceding quarter affects the accuracy of the earnings prediction. Overall, the results support the hypothesis.
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Focusing on cost stickiness, I now examine the effect of cost stickiness on absolute forecast errors separately for sales decreases and sales increases. Evidence reported in Table 5 indicates that the association is stronger for sales declines (adj R 2 =37.7%) than for sales increases (adj R 2 =5.6%). Essentially, cost stickiness when sales decline drives a considerable portion of the variability of analysts' forecast errors.
Apparently, the association between cost stickiness and accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts is more pronounced on sales decreases, which is line with the sticky cost concept in Anderson et al. (2003) .
Furthermore, evidence on the mean forecast error (not on the absolute error) reported in Table 6 offers insights into the validity of assuming that analysts recognize cost 12 Further checking for a potential seasonality effect, I also computed the stickiness measure using cost responses relative to the same quarter of the preceding year. Results from estimating model 1 confirm the earlier results.
behavior. Results show that the mean forecast error of firms with sticky costs is insignificantly different from that of firms with anti-sticky costs.
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Thus, the evidence supports the assumption that analysts understand cost behavior to a reasonable extent.
[ Table 6 about here]
Results of testing hypothesis H2
Results showing that firms with more sticky cost behavior have lower analyst coverage are presented in Table 7 . To see the intuition, suppose, on the contrary, that an analyst ignores cost stickiness. Consequently, her forecast would be upward biased in case of sticky costs (forecast error = reported earningsforecast <0) because she under-estimates costs on demand falls. In a similar vein, her forecast would be downward biased in case of anti-sticky costs (forecast error = reported earnings -forecast >0) because she over-estimates costs on demand falls. Thus, sticky costs trigger a negative mean forecast error and anti-sticky costs trigger a positive mean forecast error (i.e., bias, not absolute forecast error). However, results reported in Table 6 indicate the mean forecast error is not significantly different for observations with sticky versus anti-sticky costs. Therefore, the data supports the assumption that analysts recognize cost stickiness to a reasonable extent. 14 The analysis implicitly assumes that an equivalent effort is expended for estimating sticky and antisticky costs. This assumption is sensible in this context because cost stickiness is estimated from public information reported in financial statements.
coefficient of DISP is positive and significant. The coefficients of GROWTH and LOSS are insignificant.
The coefficient estimate of RD is also positive and highly significant, consistent with Barth et al. (2001) . To further check the robustness of the cost behavior effect, I
separately examine the cost stickiness effect on analyst coverage for firms with and without R&D expenditures. Results (not tabulated) indicate that cost stickiness is significantly associated with analyst coverage for firms with and without R&D expenditures. In sum, the evidence indicates that firms with more sticky cost behavior have lower analyst coverage. Table 8 presents results from testing whether market response to earnings surprises is weaker for firms with more sticky cost behavior. In line with prior studies, coefficient estimates β 1 in all regression models are positive and highly significant, indicating a positive market response to earnings surprises. The estimated coefficients for the interaction variable are positive and significant when cost stickiness relates to total costs (models 3(a) and 3(d)), but only marginally significant when cost stickiness relates to SGA costs (model 3(c)), and insignificant with respect to stickiness of COGS (model 3(b)). 15 Findings indicate that investors tend to consider cost stickiness with respect to total costs, but find it hard to figure stickiness of cost components.
Results of testing hypothesis H3
The explanatory power in the models ranges between 1.8% and 2.9%, which is in line with prior literature (e.g., Gu and Wu, 2003) . To strengthen the evidence, I take a predictive rather than contemporaneous approach in estimating cost stickiness. Model 3(e) shows a lower market reaction to earnings surprises for firms with less sticky costs estimated on the preceding quarter (note that STICKY<0 indicates sticky costs).
Overall, results indicate that market response to earnings surprises is weaker for firms with more sticky cost behavior with respect to total costs, in support of H3.
[ Table 8 about here]
The result contributes to the ongoing debate on investor rationality by documenting that investors are able to process accounting information and partially infer cost behavior in a rational way. With respect to the control variables, coefficient estimates for DISP are generally insignificant and coefficient estimates for VSALE are only marginally significant. Thus, dispersion of analysts' forecasts and variation of sales may not serve as appropriate proxies for ex-ante earnings uncertainty as perceived by investors. This argument is supported by Diether et al. (2002) , who interpret dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts as a proxy for differences in opinion about the stock (e.g., due to the employment of different valuation models). Overall, findings indicate that investors partly understand firms' cost behavior in responding to earnings surprises.
V. A CONCLUDING REMARK
The study utilizes a managerial accounting concept, sticky costs, to gain insights into how firms' cost behavior impacts (i) the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts, (ii)
analysts' selection of covered firms, and (iii) market response to earnings announcements. While implications of cost behavior are of primary interest to management accountants, this study employs a management accounting concept for addressing research questions usually raised by financial accountants. Although a multi-disciplinary endeavor is rare in the literature, the insights indicate that combining the perspectives of management and financial accounting is fruitful.
Further research is expected to build on this approach in exploring multi-disciplinary accountings topics. Integrating management and financial accounting research is expected to be beneficial to both disciplines.
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Lang, M., Lundholm, R., 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. FE it is the difference between reported earnings and the mean (consensus) forecasts announced in the month immediately preceding that of the earnings announcement, deflated by the price at the end of the prior quarter. ABS-FE it = ⎮ FE it ⎮.
τ , τ ∈{t,..,t-3}, where τ is the most recent quarter with sales decrease and τ is the most recent quarter with sales increase.
COST it is sales (Compustat #2) minus net earnings (Compustat #8) for firm i in quarter t.
SALE it is Compustat #2 for firm i in quarter t.
COGS-STICKY
τ , τ ∈{t,..,t-3}, where τ is the most recent quarter with sales decrease and τ is the most recent quarter with sales increase. COGS it is
Compustat #30 for firm i in quarter t.
SGA-STICKY
τ , τ ∈{t,..,t-3}, where τ is the most recent quarter with sales decrease and τ is the most recent quarter with sales increase. SGA it is
Compustat #1 for firm i in quarter t. M-STICKY it is the difference between the mean cost function slope under upward adjustments made on quarters from t-7 through t and the mean cost function slope under downward adjustments made on quarters from t-7 through t.
MV it is the log of market value of equity (Compustat #61 x #14) on quarter end.
LOSS it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the reported earnings (Compustat #8) are negative and 0 otherwise.
FLLW it is the number of analysts' earnings forecasts announced for firm i and quarter t in the month immediately preceding that of the earnings announcement.
DISP it is the standard deviation of the analysts' forecasts announced for firm i and quarter t during the 30 days prior to the earnings announcement, deflated by the stock price at the end of quarter t-1. Anderson et al. (2003) and estimates reported by Anderson and Lanen (2007) .
Mean SGA-STICKY j is the mean value of SGA-STICKY across all sample observations at the two-digit SIC-code level, j=20 to 39.
is the coefficient estimate from estimating the regression of the following model using all sample observations at the two-digit SIC-code level, j=20 to 39.
Model 4
where SALEDEC i,t equals 1 if SALE i,t <SALE i,t-1 and 0 otherwise. SGA i,t is Compustat #1 and SALE is Compustat #2.
Anderson-Lanen coefficients are taken for the respective two-digit SIC-code industries from Panel B of Table 6 in Anderson and Lanen (2007) . a -Mann-Whitney test indicates a significant difference between the medians at the 5% level. The regression model was estimated using a standard negative binomial distribution because the dependent variable (FLLW) is count-data. The dispersion parameter was estimated by maximum likelihood. p-values are reported in parentheses. The pseudo-R 2 , also named McFadden's R 2 , is the loglikelihood value on a scale from zero to one, where zero corresponds to the constant-only model and one corresponds to perfect prediction (a log-likelihood of zero). Variable definitions are in Table 1 . CAR it = Cumulative market-adjusted returns (raw return minus value-weighted CRSP return) measured over 3 trading days surrounding earnings announcement, from the day before to the day after.
Variables
p-values based on two-tailed tests are in parentheses. Definitions of the other variables are in Table 1 .
Appendix
Employing cost stickiness as a yardstick, I develop a simple two-period model to predict a relationship between the level of cost stickiness and the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. The primitive model input in the first period is a set of prior beliefs on the state of the world, say demand y, which is a realization of a random variable ỹ , drawn from a distribution function, Φ(y), with a strictly positive and symmetric density, φ(y), 16 The revenue function depends on previously made managerial choices, like product price. See also Balakrishnan and Sivaramakrishnan (2002) . 17 I note that cost stickiness does not depend on the operational leverage of the firm because the fixed cost component, f, does not influence the level of cost stickiness.
I use cost of adjustments to expand the conventional fixed-variable cost model and estimate stickiness of firms' cost functions. My approach follows Wernerfelt (1997) , who shows that the magnitude of an adjustment cost drives the form of the organization, and Balakrishnan and Gruca (2008) , who show that cost stickiness is greater for cost functions that relate to an organization's core competency. Rothschild (1971) models properties of convex (concave) adjustment cost structures that result in asymmetric cost functions due to the cost of producing marginal unit increases (decreases) in the activity level. Anderson et al. (2003) suggest that current managerial choices are also likely to affect cost behavior due to economic forces acting to restrain or expedite resource adjustments.
For instance, an unexpected fall in demand may induce managers to purposely delay reductions in committed resources until they receive more information about the permanence of the decline in demand, resulting in cost stickiness.
In the proposed model, the earnings function, Π(y,α) = R(y)-C(y,α), is strictly increasing in y and transforms demand y realized in the second period into earnings.
The ex-ante earnings expectations in the first period are denoted Π ( ỹ ,α). In the second period, the firm truly reports its realized earnings, Π(y,α).
An analyst is delegated the task of producing accurate estimates of a firm's earnings expectations and the forecast is honest, as in, for example, Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) . In the first period, the analyst announces Π ( ỹ ,α) as her most accurate forecast, if her error loss function is symmetric and concave (e.g., a quadratic loss function).
18
Focusing on the absolute earnings forecast error as an accuracy gauge, the proposition below proves a negative relationship between the level of cost stickiness and the mean absolute earnings forecast error. That is, higher values of α, i.e., less sticky cost behavior, result in lower mean absolute analyst forecast errors.
18 A discussion on the properties of a symmetric error loss function appears in Beja and Weiss (2006) . Based on the proposition, I argue that cost stickiness, which reflects a firm's abilities to adjust under favorable and unfavorable circumstances, is a determinant of the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts. Specifically, the uncertainty regarding future reported earnings faced by an analyst is proportional to the ex-ante volatility of reported earnings.
More sticky costs increase the spread of the ex-ante distribution of earnings, which increases the ex-ante volatility of reported earnings. For that reason the proposition motivates hypothesis H1: greater ex-ante volatility of reported earnings imposed by more sticky cost behavior reduces the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts.
